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The Contested Shaping of International Tax Rules: The Growth of Services 







The digitalisation of the economy has spotlighted fundamental flaws in international tax rules, 
which have been exacerbated since the 1970s with the wider shift to the services economy 
and the growth of international services. These systemic flaws have been more evident from 
the perspective of countries that are mainly importers of services that have tried to retain rights 
to tax profits at the source from which they derive. While they succeeded in retaining a wider 
scope for source taxation, key provisions have been subject to continuing conflicts and 
contestation over their formulation and interpretation, leaving a legacy of ambiguity and 
confusion. Digitalisation has now sparked a dramatic reversal of perspective by more 
developed countries and an acceptance of principles they have long resisted: that taxation of 
transnational corporations can be based on apportionment of an appropriate fraction of their 
global income and can be by countries from where they derive income, regardless of physical 
presence. This paper outlines the contested process that has shaped the formulation of key 
provisions on taxation of international services, discusses the recent moves to reshape these 
rules and evaluates some policy options for capital-importing countries to strengthen their 
taxing rights in the current context.  
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Introduction: Services and digitalisation 
 
Recent debates and negotiations on the reform of international taxation have led to a re-
examination of the two basic issues for taxation of transnational corporations (TNCs): (i) the 
basis for taxable presence and (ii) the allocation of TNC profits among countries where they 
have activities. The recent focus on these issues resulted, in particular, from concerns about 
the effects of the digitalisation of economic activity, which was Action One of the project on 
base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS). The BEPS project was launched in 2012 by the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and supported by the G20 
world leaders in 2013. The report on Action One in the 2015 BEPS project package clearly 
showed that digitalisation had only exacerbated existing problems in international tax rules 
resulting from the longer-term process of dematerialisation of economic activities.1 Hence, the 
efforts to find a comprehensive solution continued, with participation open to all states through 
the Inclusive Framework on BEPS (Hearson 2020).  
 
Digitalisation, although significant, has only accelerated these longer-term changes, already 
seen in the shift from goods to services. Services have grown in economic importance in all 
countries with the emergence of a post-industrial economy since the 1970s. They now account 
for over 60% of GDP by value added worldwide and as much as 75% in high-income 
countries.2 Compared to discrete sales of physical goods, services generally involve a closer 
and more continuous relationship between the service provider and the client or customer, 
often remunerated through recurring fees rather than one-off payments. Many services are 
personal and, therefore, their provision usually entails physical proximity.  
 
At the same time, improvements in telecommunications have increasingly facilitated the 
remote provision and even internationalisation of many types of services. Cross-border trade 
in services rose from 6% of GDP worldwide in 1975 to 8.5% in 1995 and then more steeply to 
reach 13% in 2015.3 Services are an important input into other sectors, such as manufacturing 
and extractive industries, and therefore account for a higher proportion of trade by value added 
– estimated at almost 50% of world trade by this measure in 2015 (WTO 2019: 45).4  
 
 
1 All the BEPS project reports are available at http://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/beps-actions/ ; a further lengthy report on Action One 
in 2018 reaffirmed the 2015 report’s conclusions of that digitalisation had affected the whole economy, so solutions could not be 
ring-fenced. It is worth noting that the conclusions of these reports were very different from those of the lengthy examination of 
the international tax implications of e-commerce conducted in 1999-2005, which concluded that the business models emerging 
from new communications technologies ‘would not, by themselves, justify a departure from current rules’ (OECD 2005: 151). 
 
2 See the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, Table 4.2 Structure of Output, available at 
https://datatopics.worldbank.org/world-development-indicators/. 
 
3 Derived from World Bank Open Data: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BG.GSR.NFSV.GD.ZS. These are based on IMF 
extended balance of payments (EBOP) statistics, which report transactions between residents and non-residents, in line with the 
UN Manual on Statistics of International Trade in Services, and the definition of services in the UN System of National Accounts 
(see United Nations 2010: 8; Loungani, Mishra, Papageorgiou and Wang 2017). A wider definition of trade in services is used by 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) for its General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), which covers four ‘modes’: 1, cross-
border supply; 2, consumption abroad; 3, ‘commercial presence’; and 4, presence of natural persons. Data for mode 3, 
‘commercial presence’, which involves local sales by a foreign-owned entity, use the Foreign Affiliate Statistics (FATS). Although 
considered ‘trade’ in WTO terms, these revenues from the supply of services in a host country by affiliates of foreign entities are 
not international transactions for tax (or foreign exchange) purposes. The WTO has compiled an analytical dataset using the data 
from EBOP and FATS, presented by mode of supply, and reallocated according to the WTO’s Sectoral Classification List, which 
differs from the UN and IMF sectoral definitions (WTO 2019; United Nations 2010: Annex IV). 
 
4 This is a low estimate, as it does not capture in-house services of manufacturing firms (WTO 2019: 46). 
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Richer states have dominated the export of services. Although there has been a relative 
decline in developed countries’ share of total services exports, from 99% in 1970 to 82% in 
2015, the expanding share from developing countries has been mainly from five jurisdictions - 
China, India, Singapore, Korea and Hong Kong (Loungani, Mishra, Papageorgiou and Wang 
2017; WTO 2019: 33). Furthermore, all developing countries have a substantial net deficit in 
services trade. According to the World Trade Organization (WTO), developing countries as a 
whole accounted for 25% of total world services exports in 2017 but 34% of imports (50% 
higher), while, for least developed countries, exports were 0.3% and imports 0.9% of the global 
total (300% higher) (WTO 2019: 32).5  
 
As these data show, this expansion of services and their internationalisation began in the 
1970s and has accelerated since the mid-1990s, greatly aided by digitalisation. This shift to 
services entailed a dematerialisation of economic activities that made it increasingly easy for 
TNCs to derive profits from activities in countries with little or no physical presence and attribute 
large parts of such profits to jurisdictions where they can be taxed at low rates.  
 
The focus on digitalisation in the BEPS project has led to proposals that mark a reversal of 
direction on international tax rules by OECD member states. There is now an acceptance that 
some proportion of profits should be taxable by countries where they are earned even without 
a physical presence and this should be based on apportionment of an appropriate share of the 
TNC’s global profits. However, the proposals have focused on services to consumers, which 
have become intermediated through digital platforms and the internet. Due to US concerns 
that new rules should not target only the highly digitalised TNCs, which are mainly US-based, 
the proposals under Pillar One put forward a wider scope but extending only to ‘consumer-
facing’ business (OECD 2020b). This left the rules for most business services untouched, as 
well as all other economic sectors.  
 
The need for more comprehensive reforms is evident, especially for countries that are mainly 
hosts for TNCs. For a much longer period, they have been aware of the wider international tax 
challenges posed by services more generally and by business services in particular. Wider 
reforms are important not only to achieve a more equitable allocation of tax revenues but also 
for economic development. The limitations imposed by tax treaties on source taxation of 
foreign service providers create competitive disadvantages for local service providers and 
discourage local employment in these increasingly important sectors. Indeed, all countries 
have been disadvantaged by the ability of TNCs to create conduit arrangements to route 
services provision through offshore entities located in countries where their profits are taxed 
at low or zero rates. Hence, reforms of international tax rules, particularly for business services, 
are also important for national economic development and to redress the imbalances in 
international flows of services. 
 
Fortunately, developing countries have long aimed to protect source taxation, particularly of 
services. This can be seen in differences between the model treaties developed through the 
OECD and the United Nations.6 This paper will outline the historical development of the key 
provisions on taxation of international services, focusing particularly on the efforts to protect 
source taxation in the UN model convention and the continuing debates over their 
interpretation. It will also discuss the recent moves to reshape these international rules, many 
of which entail revisiting past understandings and interpretations. Finally, it will evaluate some 




5 These WTO data include revenues from ‘commercial presence’, as explained above. 
 
6 For an account and discussion of the development of the international tax system from the perspective of developing countries 
see Picciotto 2013; and Hearson 2021. The latest versions of the models at the time of writing are OECD 2017a and UN 2017. 
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This paper will show that, from the beginning of the formulation of international tax rules, it was 
understood that the only effective way to tax the profits of TNCs is to treat them as unitary 
enterprises and apportion those profits in line with their activities in each country. The recent 
re-emergence of this understanding can provide a basis for the effective reforms the system 
now needs, although there remain significant hurdles to overcome. The problems stem not 
simply from geo-political conflicts between states but require a careful rethinking and reshaping 
of the principles and technical concepts to enable a better practical operation of the system. It 
is particularly important in this process to bring to the fore the perspective of lower-income 
countries since the primary aim of the current reforms should be to strengthen taxation at 
source where real activities take place. 
 
 
1 Development of international tax rules on 
services 
 
Services present the central problem of international tax coordination in a particularly acute 
form. This problem arises because states can exert their power to tax by asserting personal 
jurisdiction over their residents on their total income or jurisdiction over activities taking place 
in their territory or both. Hence, when a resident of one country performs services for customers 
in another, there is a potential for conflict. The service providers’ country of residence can 
assert the right to tax their income based on their ability to pay. On the other hand, the 
customer’s country can claim that the profits from services delivered in its territory involve close 
contacts with the country and derive benefits from its infrastructure, and legal and other 
protections, and that activities should be taxed on the same basis whether they are performed 
by foreign or local providers. The potential for conflict between these two claims is stronger for 
services than for goods since it is more likely that significant elements of the activity will take 
place in both countries.  
 
This tension can be resolved in three possible ways: taxation can be exclusively by either the 
country of residence of the service provider or by the country where the services are delivered, 
or there could be an apportionment between them. Taxation solely by the country of residence 
seems inequitable; it is also problematic in practice since the concept of residence is fluid, 
especially for a legal entity such as a company. On the other hand, it is difficult for a source 
state to calculate tax on the net profits from delivery of services since a foreign service provider 
is likely to incur only part of the relevant operating expenses locally. Apportionment seems, in 
principle, the most suitable approach, but it has proved difficult to implement.  
 




At the time of formulating the first model tax conventions a century ago, organised business 
consisted mostly of manufacturing and extractive industries. Services were provided mainly by 
individuals and generally at the customer’s location since international telecommunications 
were still rudimentary. When providers of professional services began to expand 
internationally, a specific provision was included in the models (Article 14) to allow taxation of 
income from ‘independent personal services’ in the country from which the income derives 
through physical presence in the country.7 This was dropped from the OECD model in 2000 
on the grounds that services should be taxed under Articles 5 and 7 whether performed by an 
individual or through a legal entity (OECD 2000). However, Article 5 was devised for 
manufacturing and its strict physical presence requirements are inappropriate for services, 
greatly restricting source taxation (Arnold 2011: 11). Since OECD members are home and host 
countries of services providers, most of them were willing to accept this limitation. As primarily 
importers of services, developing countries have generally sought to ensure taxation of 
services where they are delivered and Article 14 was retained in the UN model.  
 
The issue is not only the allocation of taxing rights but also prevention of the erosion of the 
source country tax base since fees paid to foreign service providers for business and 
professional services are normally deductible from the taxable business profits of the service 
recipient. Furthermore, payments for the provision of services can be channelled through 
conduit companies treated as being resident in countries where such fees are taxed at a zero 
or low rate, producing ‘stateless income’, not taxed anywhere (Kleinbard 2011).8 It is relatively 
easy for TNCs to design corporate group structures so that services are provided in this way 
by intermediary entities ‘offshore’, interposed between operating affiliates in source countries 
and the residence country of the ultimate parent. Under existing international tax rules on 
transfer pricing, it is harder to challenge the attribution of profits to conduits of this type 
providing services than to a pure ‘letter box’ company since they may employ some personnel 
or own assets, even if these are used to provide services elsewhere. Offshore companies 
providing services, such as sales, marketing, logistics, distribution, engineering and systems 
support have come to play an important role in many sectors. 
 
 
7 The League of Nations models had a single article for ‘labour or personal services’, but with a specific paragraph for professional 
services (League of Nations 1946). A distinction between personal services that are ‘independent’ or ‘dependent’ (i.e. 
employment) was made in the first OECD model of 1963 (OECD 1963) and in the UN model in 1980 (United Nations 1980b) and 
since. Both models also have separate provisions for remuneration of corporate directors and senior managers, public officials, 
and artistic and sporting performers, as well as for some specific kinds of services (construction, shipping and air transportation, 
insurance). Arnold (2011, 2017) argues that the differences in treatment create incoherence and makes suggestions for 
rationalisation; although he agrees that erosion of its tax base is a strong argument for a source country to have taxing rights, he 
considers that the fundamental principle is where the services are performed, so he does not accept taxation of payments for 
services even if performed outside the country concerned (Arnold 2011: 20). Discussion of employment (contracts of service) and 
of the specific kinds of services is outside the scope of this paper. 
 
8 Conduits emerged early using holding company legislation in countries, such as Luxembourg and Switzerland, and taking 
advantage of exemptions for foreign-source income in countries such as the Netherlands. They have more recently been emulated 
by others. For example, in 1992, Mauritius enacted offshore business legislation, creating a Global Business Licence regime, to 
encourage the formation of companies resident in Mauritius to provide services abroad, including information and communication 
technology, asset management, consultancy, operational headquarters, financial services, insurance, logistics and marketing 
(TJN 2020). The income and capital gains from such activities would be subject to no or low tax in Mauritius and could escape all 
tax if protected by suitable treaties (Picciotto 2019: 15). To facilitate this, Mauritius began negotiating treaties , in particular, with 
African countries, which limited source taxation of fees for services, so that such fees charged by Mauritian companies would be 
deductible in that country, yet not taxed in Mauritius (see Table 1.2.1 and Section 1.2 below). Together with other treaty restrictions 
on source taxation, this has caused major revenue losses for African countries that have tax treaties with Mauritius. A study for 
the World Bank estimated these losses at between 15% and 25% of corporate income tax revenues in those countries, finding 




Some developing countries introduced withholding taxes on the payments of fees for technical, 
managerial, and similar business services to protect their tax base.9 They also tried to ensure 
the inclusion in their treaties of a specific article allowing this (Falcão and Michel 2018).10 To 
standardise, facilitate and legitimise such provisions, a new Article 12A on fees for technical 
services was formulated by the UN Committee and included in the UN model in 2017 to 
complement Articles 7 and 14. These provisions apply to payments made by a resident of the 
source state, so they include services performed outside that country, unlike the other 
provisions on services taxation (including Article 5.3.b), which apply only to services performed 
in the country. However, they do not apply to payments by an individual for services for their 
personal use. 
 
With the growth of digitalised services to consumers, some OECD countries, especially in 
Europe, have taken a similar approach by proposing or adopting digital services taxes (DSTs) 
(KPMG 2019; KPMG 2020). Countries in other regions have also announced or proposed such 
measures, although fewer have been implemented.11 These aim mainly at consumer services 
with some differences in their scope. These types of taxes are generally formulated as 
applicable to the gross payment amounts, whether the obligation to pay the tax is on the person 
making the payment or receiving it.12 
 
The about-turn on source taxation has, since 2018, changed the nature of the BEPS process, 
which, in its first phase, explicitly excluded any reconsideration of the existing allocation of 
taxing rights between residence and source. The OECD has now formulated proposals under 
Action One of the BEPS project covering both automated digitalised services and consumer-
facing business, which would grant what is described as a ‘new taxing right’ for source taxation 
(OECD 2020a; OECD 2020b). However, although the scope is still to be decided, the proposal 
does not cover business-to-business (B2B) services. In parallel, the UN Committee initiated 
work on automated digitalised services, which concluded with the approval of a proposal for a 
new Article 12B in 2021 (United Nations 2021).  
 
These initiatives and proposals go to the heart of the two central principles in international tax, 
taxable presence and allocation of income. The next parts of this section aim to improve 
understanding of these rules by tracing how the relevant provisions of the model conventions 
emerged and developed. 
 
1.2 Taxable presence and the ‘Services PE’ 
 
The impact of digitalisation has now clearly shown the unsuitability of the concept of 
‘permanent establishment’ (PE), which became the basis for taxable presence in the model 
conventions. Indeed, recent measures abandon this concept, although some apply a size 
threshold, as discussed below. 
 
9 See further Section 2.1 below. Conduit structures are also used to channel royalty payments, which are also subject to 
withholding taxes under Article 12, which is more universally accepted. 
 
10 A simple search in the main treaty databases suggests that about half of treaties in force include such a provision: 1438 in the 
database of the International Bureau for Fiscal Documentation (IBFD n.d.), and 1954 in the Tax Analysts database (Tax Notes 
n.d.). Differences can be due to various factors, such as the method of compilation of the database, and duplication of versions 
in different languages. 
 
11 The African Tax Administration Forum published model legislation, which included rules for attributing revenue derived from 
users (ATAF 2020b); some ten African countries have announced their intention to introduce such taxes (Magwape 2021), but it 
seems that only three have done so (Kenya, Nigeria and Zimbabwe) and that they are of more limited scope and different design 
from the ATAF suggested approach. 
 
12 For example, India’s Equalisation Levy of 2016 (Finance Act 2016, ch. VIII and accompanying Rules), which was applied to 
digital advertising, operated by withholding (an obligation on the person paying for the service); the new version enacted in 2020 
applies a wider range of services provided by any ‘e-commerce operator’, although it also is levied on the gross revenues. DSTs 
introduced by other countries generally apply to the service providers, but they can of course still pass on the charges to their 





The definition of a PE has been a continuing bone of contention between home and host 
countries of TNCs. The first model tax treaty provisions negotiated through the League of 
Nations gave a right to tax active business income to each country where an ‘undertaking’ has 
a ‘permanent establishment’ (League of Nations 1928). If there were PEs in both state parties 
to a treaty, each could tax the ‘portion of income produced in its territory’ (ibid.). The concepts 
of an ‘undertaking’ and a PE were deliberately open-ended to achieve consensus.13 The term 
‘undertaking’ implied simply the business activity, so it could apply to the TNC as a whole, as 
favoured by those supporting the ‘organic unity’ concept of a corporate group (Carroll 1933: 
664). This would mean that a subsidiary could be a PE and would allow apportionment of 
profits among all affiliates within a TNC corporate group, treated as a single enterprise 
(Langbein 1986: 631). Although the League model provided that the undertaking’s global 
income should be apportioned between PEs, the methodology was left to be agreed upon by 
the competent administrations of the states concerned. 
 
The divergence between capital-exporting and capital-importing countries became evident in 
the so-called Mexico and London drafts of the League of Nations model.14 There were some 
differences between them on defining the PE criterion, but more importantly, the Mexico draft 
did not limit taxation of business income to the profits attributable to a PE. It included a 
provision that income from any business or gainful activity ‘shall be taxable only in the State 
where the business or activity is carried out’ unless there were only ‘isolated or occasional 
transactions’. This was omitted from the London draft (League of Nations 1946: 13-14; 60).  
 
The shaping of international tax rules began to take a very different direction when the OECD 
took up the dominant role in formulating a model treaty. This placed the issue of international 
taxation firmly in the context of the liberalisation of international investment, particularly foreign 
direct investment (FDI) by TNCs, which the OECD strongly supported.  
 
The OECD’s first model convention of 1963 (OECD 1963) firmly restricted taxation at source 
of business income.15 First, non-residents could be taxed only on the business income derived 
from a country through a PE, narrowly defined in physical terms as a ‘fixed place of business’ 
(Article 5.1). Secondly, only the income ‘attributable to’ that PE could be taxed (Article 7.1). 
Taxation of professional services was also limited to the income attributable to a ‘fixed base’ 
(Article 14). Finally, the model prohibited any taxation by the source country not otherwise 
permitted in the treaty, in the article on Other Income (Article 21). These provisions have 
remained substantially unchanged to this day. 
 
13 The 1928 model stated only that ‘Income from any ... undertaking ... shall be taxable in the State in which the permanent 
establishments are situated. The real centres of management, branches, mining and oilfields, factories, workshops, agencies, 
warehouses, offices, depots, shall be regarded as permanent establishments’ (League of Nations 1928). Jogarajan’s detailed 
account of the work of the government experts shows that they left unresolved deep differences that are still present today on key 
problems ‘such as the definition of PE, the treatment of agents, and the apportionment of profits’, and consensus was reached 
only by leaving terms undefined or ambiguous (Jogarajan 2018: 246). This she regards as a necessary compromise between 
divergent perspectives, though she concedes that the strongly pro-residence views of the British and Swiss experts were 
influential. Kobetsky considers that at the time the business profits article was a ‘significant achievement by source countries’ 
(Kobetsky 2011: 125). Wells and Lowell make the strongly-expressed counter-argument that the primacy of residence taxation as 
the ‘foundational premise’ of tax treaties originated already in the League models, stemming from a ‘mercantilist paradigm ... 
premised on the belief that the imperial countries were the source of capital and know-how while the colonies were rather passive 
suppliers of goods or services with little value added functionality’ (Wells and Lowell 2012: 540). They also point out that business 
representatives, through the International Chamber of Commerce, endorsed a formulary apportionment approach to the allocation 
of TNCs’ business profits as the best way to ensure no double taxation at that time (Wells and Lowell 2013), and both Langbein 
(1986) and Kobetsky (2011) consider that this was the better road not chosen.  
 
14 Published in 1946, based on drafts resulting from regional conferences held in Mexico City in 1940 and 1943 attended mainly 
by Latin American countries and from a London meeting in 1946 (League of Nations 1946). 
 
15 Following the failure to continue the League’s work through the United Nations, the OECD took a dominant role in international 
taxation (Picciotto 1992: 50-52, Hearson 2021). However, the restrictions on source taxation made the OECD model an unsuitable 
basis for negotiating treaties with countries that are mainly hosts for foreign investment, resulting in the establishment of a United 
Nations Group of Experts on Tax Treaties Between Developed and Developing Countries in 1967. Its 25 members are appointed 
as individual experts, though they have generally been government officials or advisers, at least when appointed; since it is a UN 




In contrast, the UN Group of Experts, set up in 1967, attempted to find compromises between 
the perspectives of home and host countries of TNCs.16 These were particularly acute for 
services, for which a majority of members, especially those from developing countries, 
favoured taxation at source (Surrey 1978: 8-14). The UN model tax convention that was finally 
published in 1980 gave a much wider scope for source taxation of services than the OECD’s 
model, although it did not go as far as this majority wished.17 It included a provision that income 
from the furnishing of services in a country by an enterprise above an agreed monetary 
threshold should be taxable in that country, although only as an option in the Commentary.18 
A monetary threshold criterion was also included in the article on fees for professional services 
(Article 14), along with two further criteria for source taxation: if the income was attributable to 
a fixed base or if the service provider stayed in the country for 183 days or more. The 
Commentary explained that these three provisions were included as alternatives to represent 
the different views of members.19 The monetary threshold criterion was omitted from the UN 
model’s Article 14 in 1999. 
 
The UN model also included a provision in Article 5 for a ‘services PE’, allowing taxation of a 
non-resident on profits from services if they were delivered in a country through personnel: 
 
Article 5.3. The term ‘permanent establishment’ likewise encompasses: [...] 
b. The furnishing of services, including consultancy services, by an enterprise through 
employees or other personnel engaged by the enterprise for such purpose, but only 
where activities of that nature continue (for the same or a connected project) within the 
country for a period or periods aggregating more than six months within any 12-month 




16 The Group started from the text of the existing OECD model, while recognising its unsuitability for treaties between countries 
with asymmetrical capital flows. Nevertheless, the UN model followed the general approach and structure of that of the OECD, 
and adopted many of the articles verbatim, including in such cases extracts from the Commentary of the OECD model in its own 
Commentary. Both Commentaries are published together with the text of the respective model, citations to the Commentaries will 
refer to the paragraph of the Commentary relating to the treaty Article concerned, as is customary. 
 
17 After five meetings of the Group, the UN Secretariat in 1974 produced a set of Guidelines based on its discussions (United 
Nations 1974), which were approved at its sixth meeting. At the seventh meeting in 1977, it decided to draft a model convention 
(United Nations 1978: 4), responding to a suggestion in the report of a UN Group of Eminent Persons on The Impact of 
Multinational Corporations on Development and on International Relations. A draft model based on the Guidelines (Surrey 1978) 
was produced by a group at Harvard Law School, supervised by Prof. Stanley S. Surrey, who had been Assistant Secretary for 
Tax Policy at the US Treasury (1961-69) and acted as special advisor to the rapporteur of the UN Group. The 1978 draft model 
appears to have been considered in January 1979 by a drafting committee established at the Group’s seventh meeting. It was 
further scrutinised and revised at the Group’s eighth meeting in December 1979 on the basis of written comments received by 
members (United Nations 1980a: 3-4) and another drafting committee was established. The model convention (United Nations 
1980b) follows the 1978 draft, but has some significant differences. A revised version of the 1974 Guidelines became the first UN 
Manual for the Negotiation of Tax Treaties Between Developed and Developing Countries. 
 
18 There were divergent views on suitability of, or even the need for, a monetary threshold (UN 1980b: 65). 
 
19 It also clarified that Article 14 concerned the remuneration of individuals; payments to an enterprise came under Article 5 (United 




This was a compromise formulation. The six-month requirement was not in the initial draft 
prepared under Stanley Surrey’s supervision but was inserted after discussions in the Group 
or its drafting committee.20 The Commentary reported that some developing country members 
preferred that there should be no time threshold requirement (for either construction activities 
or services).21 Article 5.3.b has remained substantially the same since that time.22  
 
Around one-third of actual treaties now in force include a services PE provision based on the 
UN model’s Article 5.3.b.23 However, a few of these provisions diverge from the UN model in 
significant respects. In particular, a variation has been used, mainly by Mauritius, which limits 
it to services furnished through employees or other personnel ‘engaged in’ the source state 
(see Table 1.2.1).24  
 
Table 1.2.1 Treaties with modified UN Model 5.3.b 
 
Date signed In force State A State B 
24/04/1992 22/01/1996 Ecuador Romania* 
12/03/1994 28/07/1995 China Luxembourg 
29/06/1994 08/11/1994 Mauritius Swaziland 
01/08/1994 05/05/1995 Mauritius China 
09/01/1995 18/05/2001 China Croatia 
04/03/1995 25/07/1996 Mauritius Namibia 
24/08/1995 pending Mauritius Russia 
26/09/1995 13/03/1996 Mauritius Botswana 
12/03/1996 02/05/1997 Mauritius Sri Lanka 
14/02/1997 08/05/1999 Mauritius Mozambique 
15/02/1997 16/02/1999 India Namibia 
29/08/1997 09/09/2004 Mauritius Lesotho 
01/10/1997 10/06/1998 Mauritius Thailand 
30/03/1998 23/06/2000 Namibia Russia 
21/01/2000 12/06/2000 Mauritius Cyprus 
30/07/2001 14/04/2003 Mauritius Rwanda** 
19/09/2003 21/07/2004 Mauritius Uganda 
31/08/2004 10/09/2006 Netherlands Uganda 
 
20 There do not seem to be official records of the work of the drafting committees or of the comments provided by members on 
the drafts; some documentation may exist in Stanley Surrey’s papers deposited at Harvard Law School, but these have not been 
accessed for the present paper. 
 
21 United Nations 1980b, 64. This statement has been retained in the 2017 model (Commentary para. 10). 
 
22 The final clause was amended in the 2011 model to read ‘183 days in any twelve-month period commencing or ending in the 
fiscal year concerned’ and in the 2017 model the phrase ‘(for the same or a connected project)’ was omitted. 
 
23 An analysis using the IBFD database in May 2020 found that this provision was included in 1131 (35.6%) of the 3181 treaties 
in force with an English version. This was conducted as a TradeLab project by students at the Graduate Institute of Geneva 
(Edgard Carneiro Vieira, Boris Ohanyan and Natalia Mouzoula) and I am grateful to them for the study. This study involved 
rigorous sifting and manual evaluation of the search results to produce both more accurate quantitative data and the significant 
qualitative findings discussed in this paper.  
 
24 The treaties negotiated by Mauritius did not contain a services PE provision until the treaties with Swaziland and China in 1994, 
but since then, when a services PE was included, it was this modified version in all but seven treaties. This was evidently linked 
to the adoption by Mauritius in 1992 of offshore business legislation, discussed in the introduction above. A brief account of 
Mauritius’s tax treaties, from a practitioner’s perspective, is provided by Erriah (2020), but it does not mention this variation from 
the UN model or discuss the reasons for it. 
This was revised in 2018 after review as a ‘harmful tax practice’ under Action 5 of the BEPS project, but it was replaced by a 
partial exemption provision that has a similar effect.  
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11/03/2005 22/06/2005 Mauritius Seychelles 
18/09/2006 31/07/2007 Mauritius UAE 
21/12/2009 15/09/2010 Mauritius Bangladesh 
21/11/2011 22/02/2017 Kenya UAE 
29/05/2012 13/07/2017 Kenya Iran 
10/08/2012 pending Mauritius Nigeria 
19/12/2012 10/03/2014 Mauritius Egypt 
15/10/2014 23/04/2015 Mauritius Malta 
11/03/2017 22/01/2019 Mauritius Ghana 
16/10/2019 pending Mauritius Kenya 
* The 1992 Ecuador – Romania treaty has a slightly different version: ‘through its own personnel or through other personnel 
employed in the other Contracting State’. This creates further ambiguity, as it is not clear whether the limitation ‘employed in the 
other Contracting State’ also applies to its own personnel. 
 
** No longer in force. 
 
This apparently minor change largely nullifies the effect of the article since there is no reason 
or incentive for the non-resident entity to employ local personnel. Hence, the provision has the 
effect of exporting potential jobs, as well as tax revenues from the source country. Conduit 
countries are more likely to accept a services PE than a withholding tax, which is much easier 
to apply. Only four treaties negotiated by Mauritius allow a withholding tax on fees for technical 
services (those with Botswana 1995, Uganda 2003, Rwanda 2013 and India 2016). Those 
negotiating treaties with Mauritius may have been lulled into thinking including a services PE 
was sufficient protection without noticing the significant modification in this version of the 
provision. 
 
A second distinctive variation is that some treaties include the services PE provision in 
Paragraph 2, which may be read to imply that the requirement of Paragraph 1 for a ‘fixed place 
of business’ must also be satisfied.25  
 
The Services PE provision also leaves considerable room for interpretation of the degree of 
physical presence required and wide divergences have become evident. At the UN Committee 
of Experts in 2013, some members said that they interpreted Article 5.3.b as meaning that the 
delivery of services must continue for 183 days but this requirement does not apply to the 
physical presence of personnel.26 The Committee as a whole agreed that the traditional 
interpretation of the provision requires some physical presence of employees in the source 
state. Some members argued that the question should be addressed in the commentary, 
especially in the context of digitalisation (United Nations 2013: paras. 16-17). The need to 
revise the commentary was reiterated in 2014 (United Nations 2014: para. 19) but did not 
occur. Hence, the ambiguity has remained.  
 
 
25 The commentary for Paragraph 5.2 of the UN model states that ‘the requirements of paragraph 1 must also be met’ (UN 2017: 
154), implying that a fixed base is needed. However, in India, which has a number of treaties of this type, the courts have not 
accepted this interpretation (see in particular Morgan Stanley 2007: 14). This was also the view taken in a South African case AB 
LLC and BD Holdings LLC (2015), which concerned the US-South Africa treaty, in which the services PE provision is paragraph 
5.2(k). The services provider in that case sent employees who worked at the client’s premises, which it contended could not be 
regarded as a ‘fixed place of business available’ to it, as required by paragraph 1. The Tax Court held that the term ‘includes’ in 
Paragraph 2 can mean ‘extends to’, but courts in other countries may take a different view (Gerwig 2019: 80). 
 
26 The specified period can be shorter or longer in actual treaties, many provide for 90 days. It may be significant that 5.3.b uses 
the term ‘furnish’ rather than ‘perform’, which is used in Article 14. The optional provision for a services PE included in the OECD 
model’s Commentary in 2010 (discussed in Section 1.2 below) specifies that the services must be ‘performed ... through one or 
more individuals who are present and performing such services in that other state’ (OECD 2017a: para. 144). The UN article is 
obviously worded more widely. 
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As it stands, it seems that there are three different interpretations of Article 5.3.b held by states: 
(i) that the physical presence of personnel must extend to 183 days; (ii) that there must be 
some physical presence of personnel in the source state, but the 183-day threshold applies to 
the period during which the services are provided and not to their presence; or (iii) no physical 
presence of personnel is needed, provided that the delivery of services extends for 183 days. 
Under this third interpretation, it is still necessary to show that the services are delivered in the 
state concerned since the article specifies that the activities must continue ‘within’ the state for 
the requisite period. This may occur without the physical presence of personnel if, for example, 
advisory or consultancy services are provided by telephone or internet.  
 
Services may also be considered taxable regardless of where they are delivered if the payment 
is deductible by a person resident in the state since this erodes the country’s tax base (Arnold 
2017: 73-4). This principle has been adopted in tax treaty provisions for taxation of fees for 
technical services (Section 1.1 above). It is now included in Article 12A of the UN model, in 
which the nexus is simply the residence of the payer (United Nations 2017: 327). Similarly, the 
alternative recently developed for article 12B in the UN model to allow source taxation of 
income from automated digital services (United Nations 2021) requires only that the underlying 
payments are made by either a resident of or a PE in the source state. Hence, both articles 
apply to services even if performed outside the country that is the source of the payment. 
 
Remarkably, the recent discussions in the BEPS project have now led to an acceptance that 
the requirement of physical presence to constitute a PE could be abandoned, particularly for 
digitalised services. A new concept of ‘significant economic presence’ has emerged, reviving 
the principle in the Mexico model of applying only a revenue threshold (OECD 2015: 107). The 
blueprint for Pillar One of the BEPS project for a ‘new taxing right’ proposed a dual-threshold 
test based on the TNC’s global revenue and a minimum level of in-scope business outside the 
TNC’s domestic market (both amounts to be determined), but no threshold or presence test 
for sales in any particular jurisdiction (OECD 2020b: Section 2.3). 
 
Ending the presence requirement raises the need for a methodology to define and allocate the 
taxable net profits. In the context of an apportionment methodology, rules to identify the source 
of sales revenue no longer determine total taxation rights since sales revenue is only one of 
the factors used in formulary apportionment to allocate net income. The Pillar One blueprint 
provided detailed rules to identify the source of services income, but only for consumer 
services, based on the place of consumption of the service, even if the payment is made 
elsewhere. For example, advertising targeted at consumers in a country may be paid for by a 
TNC from its global advertising budget; tourists may pay for their travel and accommodation in 
their own residence country rather than the country they visit. However, for services of 
intermediation between buyers and sellers (e.g. a travel booking website), the blueprint 
proposes a 50:50 split between the location of the purchaser and the seller. For sales of user 
data, the source of the income would be the user’s location when the data was collected 
(OECD 2020b: Chapter 4).27 These rules attribute the location for sales revenues by 
destination, which should be one of the factors used to apply formulary apportionment. For a 
wider application, rules to define the destination of sales for business services would be 
needed. In this context, the location of the person making the payment is clearly important 
since it indicates the beneficiary of the service. A further practical reason for adopting this 
sourcing rule in Articles 12A and 12B is that it is easier to administer a tax on the payment of 
fees by using a withholding mechanism.  
 
1.3 Allocation of income 
 
 




Once a broad right to tax income at source is accepted, ascertaining the appropriate taxable 
income becomes crucial. Apportionment seems the most appropriate method since the 
activities involved in the provision of services do not occur only in the place of consumption, 
and apportionment avoids a binary choice between the country where the service provider is 
based and the customer’s country. Instead, the income can be allocated based on factors 
reflecting the extent of real activities in each country. As we have seen, the principle of 
apportionment of the total profits of an enterprise has been envisaged since the earliest model 
treaties. A shift occurred when the first OECD model in 1963 introduced the separate entity 
principle (SEP) for ‘associated enterprises’ and for PEs of an enterprise.  
 
At the same time, Article 7(4) of the OECD model of 1963 provided that a PE could be taxed 
‘on the basis of an apportionment of the total profits of the enterprise to its various parts’, in so 
far as such a method had been customary in a state (OECD 1963: 43). The term ‘enterprise’ 
continues to be ambiguous: it is unclear whether it refers to the entity or the business activity. 
Since the 1963 convention, the phrase ‘an enterprise of a contracting state’ has been defined 
as ‘an enterprise carried on by a resident of a contracting state’ (OECD 1963: 39). This is the 
phrase used in Article 9 and, in that context, it is usually taken to mean a legal person. 
However, the word ‘enterprise’ itself has, since 2000, been defined in the OECD model as ‘the 
carrying on of any business’.28 Hence, in Article 7(4), the term can be interpreted to mean the 
‘business’ of the corporate group as a whole. Furthermore, a subsidiary can be treated as an 
‘agency’ PE of its parent.29 Hence, Article 7(4) can be understood to allow the attribution of 
profits based on an apportionment of the total profits of a TNC corporate group. 
 
Article 7(4) was retained in the UN model of 1980, even after it was dropped from the OECD 
model in 2010. It is included in some two-thirds of current in-force treaties and some 28% of 
these treaties contain both this and the Services PE provision of the UN model.30 Hence, a 
high proportion of existing treaties allow a fractional apportionment method to be used to 
calculate the net profits of a PE and, in a significant number, this method can be applied to the 
furnishing of services with no need for a ‘fixed base’. However, no agreed methodology has 
ever been developed for apportionment.31 
 
 
28 This was done as part of the OECD decision to omit Article 14 and treat services as taxable under Articles 5 and 7, whether 
performed by a legal entity or a natural person; a further definition was added to specify that ‘the term “business” includes the 
performance of professional services and of other activities of an independent character’ (OECD 2000). Since the UN Committee 
did not accept the omission of Article 14, these additional definitions have not been included in the UN model.  
 
29 This also depends on the interpretation of Article 5(7): see Le Gall 2007, Avi-Yonah and Tinhaga 2014. 
 
30 This data comes from the TradeLab study conducted in 2020 mentioned in the previous sub-section. Of the 3181 identified 
treaties in force with an English language version, 2161 included Article 7.4 and 905 included both provisions. 
 
31 The UN Committee has not provided its own guidance on Article 7.4; the commentary to the UN model has simply reproduced 




Difficulty has also been caused by the widening gap between the apportionment approach and 
the separate entity principle. The latter most clearly underlies the attribution of profits to 
associated enterprises in Article 9, but a version with slightly different wording has also been 
included in Article 7.2. This requires that the profits attributable should be in line with those 
that might be expected for an independent entity ‘engaged in the same or similar activities 
under the same or similar conditions’.32 Yet, the results of apportionment, according to 
paragraph 4, ‘shall be in accordance with the principles in the article’. Hence, the standard for 
attribution of profits was essentially the same whether the starting point was separate accounts 
or the apportionment of consolidated accounts. Its presence in both articles is because it was 
devised as essentially an anti-abuse provision based on the understanding that the close 
relationship of affiliates of a TNC group makes it problematic to rely on the separate accounts.33  
 
However, the OECD has increasingly adopted an interpretation of the separate entity principle 
that makes it incompatible with an apportionment methodology. This began by developing 
methods for applying Article 9 that focused on adjusting the terms of transactions between 
affiliates, especially since the adoption of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines in 1995. 
Although these include a ‘profit split’ method, which essentially entails apportionment, it is also 
described as ‘transactional’. The OECD then went further and aimed to align Article 7 with the 
transactional approach adopted for Article 9 by adopting the ‘authorised OECD approach’ 
(AOA) to the application of a revised Article 7 in its model in 2010. This also entailed omitting 
the provision for apportionment in Paragraph 4, which had become incompatible with this 
interpretation of the separate entity principle.34 The focus on transactions is particularly 
unrealistic and impractical for PEs since they are not legally separate entities, so they cannot 
conclude contracts and are not required or normally expected to produce separate financial 
accounts (Kobetsky 2011: 285-6). 
 
These revisions to the interpretation of Article 7 created considerable confusion in relation to 
prior treaties (Kobetsky 2011: Chapter 6), especially as not all OECD members accepted the 
AOA (OECD 2017a: 197-8). The implications for services also caused disagreements, as 
shown in an extensive new section of the Commentary on Article 5 (OECD 2017a, pp. 154-
164),35 which also included a suggested provision for a services PE based on the physical 
presence of personnel for the first time. This is defined in more detail than in the UN model’s 
Article 5.3.b and clarifies that the services must be performed in the state by individuals 
physically present there.36  
 
 
32 This originated in a draft Convention adopted in 1935 to allow tax authorities to adjust the accounts of affiliates of a TNC (League 
of Nations 1935: 5-6). It specified that if separate accounts were unavailable or unsuitable, ‘empirical’ methods could be used, 
applying a suitable percentage to the establishment’s turnover; if this was found to be inapplicable, the net income could be 
determined by apportioning the total profits of the enterprise as a whole, applying ‘coefficients based on a comparison of gross 
receipts, assets, numbers of hours worked or other appropriate factors, provided such factors be so selected as to ensure results 
approaching as closely as possible to those which would be reflected by a separate accounting’ (ibid.). These were the two main 
methods that the report by Mitchell Carroll for the League had found to be generally used by tax authorities (Carroll 1933: 12; see 
Picciotto 2018: 30-31). They were included in the League’s model conventions of 1946, but omitted when the principle was 
incorporated into the OECD model in 1963. 
 
33 This was clearly the rationale in Carroll’s report (Carroll 1933). He found that since separately incorporated affiliates are required 
to produce their own accounts, these were used as the starting point by most tax authorities, but that national law also gave 
powers to adjust the accounts. Article 7(4) was included only for PEs, because they would not normally be obliged to produce 
separate accounts. Carroll also stated that ‘the term “undertaking” or enterprise includes, when referring to a corporation, merely 
the corporate entity and its own branches’ (Carroll 1933: para. 623), excluding the ‘organic unity’ view of the corporate group, 
although the use of the term in the 1928 reports allowed both interpretations.  
 
34 This was agreed in 2008 after seven years’ work (OECD 2008, Kobetsky 2011). 
 
35 This was added in 2008. 
 
36 Now in OECD 2017a: 157. Articles based on this provision appear to have been included in 21 treaties since 2008, mainly with 
Norway and New Zealand, and three with the UK.  
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Not surprisingly, the AOA was not accepted by developing countries or by the UN Committee 
(United Nations 2017: 214). Further guidance on Article 7 was issued following revisions to 
Article 5 made in the BEPS project, which again stressed the separate entity principle and the 
AOA (OECD 2018). However, due to objections from developing country members of the 
Inclusive Framework (ATAF 2018), a footnote was added stating that the new guidance on 
Article 7 was not intended to extend the application of the AOA to countries that have not 
adopted that approach in their treaties or domestic legislation (OECD 2018: 10). 
 
As with taxable presence, there has now been a reversal of direction and a revival of interest 
in apportionment. A submission from the G24 group of developing countries in Action One of 
the BEPS project proposed a new taxable nexus based on ‘significant economic presence’, 
using a monetary threshold and an apportionment of profits (G24 2019). The subsequent 
proposals from the OECD secretariat for a ‘unified approach’ also entailed formulaic methods 
for apportionment, although only for part of the global consolidated profits of TNCs (OECD 
2020a; OECD 2020b). However, they would apply only to some of the largest TNCs and would 
also retain existing methods based on the ALP to allocate the bulk of the profits. Furthermore, 
they would not apply to business services. 
 
As this discussion shows, there have long been many disagreements about the appropriate 
principles for taxation of profits from services, which have been pursued through the 
formulation and interpretation of the rules. The current situation in international tax is clearly 
highly fluid, as new rules are being formulated and old ones reinterpreted. We are in a 
transitional period, involving a shift away from dogmatic interpretations of the arm’s length 
principle and the formulation of new methodologies for implementing the principle of 
apportionment, the importance of which was identified from the start but which has remained 
largely undeveloped. The attempt in the BEPS project to reform rules originating a century ago 
presents formidable challenges, particularly if changes require revision of treaties. However, 
as we have seen in this section, much also depends on the interpretation and activation of 
existing rules in treaties and the model conventions, especially the UN version. The next 
section will briefly consider approaches available to developing countries for reinforcing source 
taxation while ensuring that their domestic laws and policies can be considered compatible 
with their tax treaties.  
 
2 Options for Source Taxation of Revenues 
from Services 
 
Countries are free to design their laws to suit their own circumstances. Treaties can restrict the 
application of national law, but only in relation to residents of a treaty partner. Developing 
countries generally have relatively few tax treaties, but TNCs may be able to take advantage 
of any treaty by creating an affiliate that is resident in that treaty partner. Provisions against 
treaty abuse may be used to combat such techniques, discussed further below. Treaty policies 
should, as far as possible, be designed to ensure that no treaty creates an undesirable 
restriction on domestic policies. At the same time, domestic law should also take into account 




Most countries tax profits arising from all activities in the country, including the delivery of 
services, under their domestic law (Govind 2012).37 However, taxation of a non-resident faces 
practical difficulties since the person or entity may not be registered for tax in the country. It 
may be difficult to enforce an obligation on them to do so, although this is easier if they have 
substantial local sales. Also, if the non-resident is an entity within a TNC corporate group, there 
may be another affiliate that is resident and can be made responsible. With the rise of e-
commerce, this issue also emerged for value-added tax, which has been reformed to apply on 
a destination basis. This has led to the strengthening of methods for collection from non-
residents, such as the use of the ‘reverse charge’ mechanism (requiring the customer rather 
than the supplier to account for the tax), simplified registration procedures, and collection 
through intermediaries such as online sales platforms (OECD 2017b; OECD 2019). These are 
also relevant for enforcing tax on non-residents’ profits.  
 
Further problems arise in determining the appropriate net profits from cross-border delivery of 
services since a high proportion of the costs will be incurred outside the country where the 
revenue is generated. Hence, the issue of tax nexus and the definition of the tax base are 
closely linked.  
 
2.1 Withholding Taxes 
 
For these reasons, source countries have often preferred to use a withholding tax mechanism 
applied to payments to non-residents. Withholding taxes are relatively easy to administer and 
hence effective. They can be formulated as a tax, either on the income of the non-resident or 
on the transaction. In the former case, some countries allow the taxpayer the option to have 
net profits taxed with a credit for the tax paid and perhaps a refund of any excess. However, 
in developing countries, they are usually treated as a final amount (Arnold 2017: 74-5).  
 
A tax on the gross payment needs to be calibrated to bear a reasonable relationship to the 
profitability of the transactions, as well as to counteract the tax loss from deduction of the 
payment from the customer’s business profits. This is particularly important for services 
provided by a related entity within a TNC group since the payment may be subject to no or low 
taxation in the hands of the recipient. As the tax is usually collected from the person paying for 
the services, it may simply be added to the charge for the services by ‘grossing up’ so that the 
service supplier receives the same net payment. Hence it will directly increase the price to the 
customer, whether formulated as an income or a transaction tax. 
 
 
37 For example, the US taxes non-residents on income ‘effectively connected’ to a trade or business in the US (Kirsch 2010); India 
taxes non-residents on income ‘accruing or arising, whether directly or indirectly, through or from any business connection in India’ 





The characterisation of the tax is important in deciding whether it can be valid under tax 
treaties, which restrict the right to tax the income of a resident in the treaty partner. A tax 
formulated as applying to transactions and not as a tax on income would fall outside the scope 
of tax treaties altogether unless it can be considered discriminatory.38 Hence, countries have 
been advised to formulate DSTs as taxes on transactions to make it easier to adopt them 
unilaterally (ATAF 2020a; ATAF 2020b). However, in practice, this characterisation can be 
hard to maintain. Nevertheless, it does seem that these taxes have not yet been challenged 
under the ‘mutual agreement’ procedures of tax treaties, although this cannot be stated for 
certain in view of the secrecy of tax treaty disputes (Picciotto 2016). On the other hand, if the 
tax is not covered by a tax treaty, it is not eligible for credits in the residence country 
(Hohenwarter, Kofler, Mayr and Sinnig 2019),39 although. However, it can usually be deducted 
as a business expense.  
 
A tax on services furnished by a non-resident may be regarded as a barrier to market access 
by foreign service providers and, hence, a possible breach of obligations under either the 
WTO’s General Agreement on Trade in Services or bilateral or regional trade and investment 
agreements (Kelsey, Bush, Montes and Ndubai 2020). For this reason, DSTs have been 
attacked as unfair trading practices, particularly by the US. This is a much more potent 
response than invoking tax treaty procedures since it can result in retaliation through trade 
sanctions. This has been done unilaterally by the US, but the validity of this retaliation has not 
been tested through the WTO.40 The conflicts over the DSTs have increased the pressures for 
reform through the BEPS process and they should be phased out if an agreement is reached. 
However, since the current BEPS project proposals do not extend to business services, source 
taxation of these services may also result in such threats. Countries should carefully consider 
the tax consequences before accepting any market access obligations for services in trade 
and investment agreements. Developing countries should, in any case, be wary of making 
such commitments, given the imbalances in international trade in services. 
 
 
38 The non-discrimination provision, in both the OECD and UN models applies to ‘taxes of every kind and description’ if they can 
be shown to discriminate against non-residents. 
 
39 In September 2020 the US Treasury proposed revisions to its foreign tax credit regulations to add a jurisdictional nexus 
requirement to its definition of an income tax eligible for credit; this would disqualify most DSTs for credit, but was criticised as 
having far wider ramifications. 
 
40 Investigations under s.301 of the US Trade Act found France’s DST to be discriminatory in July 2020 and, subsequently, those 
of Austria, Brazil, the Czech Republic, the European Union, India, Indonesia, Italy, Spain, Turkey and the United Kingdom. 
Retaliatory tariffs were announced on a range of imports, but suspended to allow time for the BEPS negotiations; their 
implementation would hurt both exporters from those countries and US consumers. They have not yet been challenged at the 
WTO, but an authoritative decision is not currently possible due to the paralysing of its Appellate Body. An evaluation of a possible 
complaint by the US against France under the WTO’s GATS suggests that it would have a good chance of success: since the EU 
has made GATS commitments to the computer and business services covered by the French DST, the tax is likely to be found 
de facto discriminatory against US firms and, since it is not an income tax, it would not be excluded by GATS article XXII.3 as a 




A tax on the income of a resident in a treaty partner must, under the OECD model, be 
specifically permitted in the applicable treaty. This is because the ‘Other Income’ article 
prevents any source taxation of income ‘not otherwise dealt with’ in the treaty.41 However, in 
the UN model this article has an additional paragraph that allows the source country to tax 
income arising in that state and ‘not dealt with’ elsewhere. In the view of one commentator, 
this ‘should be regarded as a clear rejection of the prevalence of residence state taxation’ 
(Schoueri 2020 : section 1.2.4).42 Under this interpretation of the UN model, a withholding tax 
may be applied to any type of payment, even if not explicitly included in the treaty. 
Nevertheless, withholding taxes have been challenged based on the argument that the income 
is ‘dealt with’ in Article 7, so they should be treated as business income, even if this means it 
would be untaxed due to lack of a PE. Unfortunately, little guidance is provided in the 
Commentary on the interpretation of this provision.43 However, if the domestic law provisions 
clearly provide for taxation of payments or income deriving from the country, a domestic 
tribunal should not interpret a treaty based on the UN model in such a way as to override the 
application of the tax since, in general, domestic law should apply unless there is a clear 
conflict with a treaty provision. Justifying such a tax under the UN model’s Other Income 
provision may nevertheless result in complaints under the tax treaty disputes procedure, under 
which the competent authorities must ‘endeavour’ to resolve the conflict (Picciotto 2016).44 
 
A further difficulty with withholding taxes is how to categorise the payment. This is particularly 
hard for digitalised services, which do not easily fit into the existing categories of taxable 
payments in treaties (OECD 2015: 104-5). As discussed above, the main category is fees for 
technical, professional and business services. However, this has been interpreted to require 
human knowledge and skill and, thus, to exclude services such as digitalised advertising, 
which are delivered automatically, although humans design and operate the software. This is 
the interpretation given in the Commentary to the new UN model Article 12A on fees for 
technical services.45 An alternative version of this article that applies to all services, with some 
limited exceptions, is available in the Commentary (Para. 26).  
 
 
41 Australia, Canada, Chile, Mexico, New Zealand and the Slovak Republic have a reservation against this Article 21. 
 
42 This interpretation of Article 21.3 of the UN model is not even mentioned by Yoshida (2019), though he does discuss other 
problems of its application. 
 
43 The Commentary on UN model Article 21.3 simply confirms that it ‘allows the State in which the income arises to tax such 
income if its law so provides’ and states that any double taxation due to its application should be relieved. Aside from the clear 
intent of Paragraph 3 of Article 21, it seems far-fetched to suggest that income from services is ‘dealt with’ under Article 7. This 
article deals with taxation of (net) profits and, of course, does not allow taxation of a non-resident unless there is a PE, whereas 
Article 21 refers to ‘income’ and withholding taxes apply to gross payments. 
 
44 Brazil has had such conflicts, resulting in an accommodation with Spain, but contributing to Germany’s revocation of its treaty 
(Schoueri and Silva 2012: 188); in 2014 Brazil recategorised payments for technical assistance and services as royalties and, 
hence, taxable under treaties (Salerno, Bel, ,Dias, Landaluce, Vianello, and Vasquez 2014; Arnold 2017: 86). Kenya’s taxation of 
fees for technical services paid to an affiliate in the same corporate group has been challenged based on this interpretation of the 
Other Income article and a court case was stayed pending the outcome of the MAP (Total Kenya 2020). 
 
45 The Commentary to new Article 12A (para. 62) states that technical services ‘must involve the application by the service provider 
of specialized knowledge, skill or expertise on behalf of a client or the transfer of knowledge, skill or expertise to the client’. 
Although the term ‘technical services’ is not further defined, the Commentary states it should be given the ordinary meaning, which 




Another categorisation problem has arisen in relation to services involving the supply of 
computer software. Software applications are often supplied free to facilitate delivery of other 
services, payments for which would be taxable under Articles 12A or 12B. However, much 
business software is licensed and deduction of such costs by business users can cause 
significant tax losses for importing countries. These payments should be taxable under Article 
12 of the model treaties, which covers royalties for copyright works.46 However, in 1992 the 
OECD amended its interpretation of this article to specify that it does not apply to payments 
for rights to run or operate a computer program or distribute copies, only to the more extensive 
rights to modify it.47 Payments for the rights to use software have been explicitly included in 
the royalties article in over 600 bilateral tax treaties. In 2021, the UN Committee agreed on the 
inclusion in its Commentary of an alternative to the OECD’s interpretation of Article 12, but 
issues of interpretation still remain.48 Even so, payments for services enabled by a computer 
application (e.g. for booking transport or accommodation) are not likely to qualify as payments 
for the right to use the application or software. 
 
Largely due to these uncertainties, some countries introduced taxes targeted specifically at 
payments for digitalised services, notably India with its equalisation levy.49 The new Article 12B 
approved by the UN Tax Committee is designed to plug this gap in tax treaties by allowing 
taxation of payments for automated digital services. The combination of Articles 12, 12A and 
12B should adequately provide for the application of withholding taxes on the gross amount of 
the payments for all services. Maximum rates must be fixed when negotiating the treaty, and 
if different rates apply, the categorisation of the payment could affect the rate applicable. As 
discussed in Section 2.1 above, they apply to payments made by a person resident or located 
in the state, regardless of where the service is delivered. Alternatively, a country may prefer 
the wider version of Article 12A provided in the Commentary, which covers all services (United 
Nations 2017: 330-332). However, this alternative does not allow taxation of services 
performed outside the source country unless the fees are paid to a closely related enterprise.  
 
The new Article 12B also includes an innovative option for net profits taxation, which will be 
discussed in the next section. 
 
2.2 Taxing net profits 
 
 
46 This article allows taxation at source of payments for ‘the use of, or the right to use’ a range of rights to intellectual property, by 
analogy with the letting of tangible property. 
 
47 Article 12 allows source taxation of royalties, defined to include payments ‘for the use of, or the right to use, any copyright’, as 
well as patents. In the early 1990s some argued that computer programs should not be treated as creative works and protected 
by copyright, but as functional technical innovations and, hence, industrial property. The powerful business software lobbies 
secured both types of protection. Hence, many computer programs can now obtain patents and, since 1995, all members of the 
WTO have been obliged to give computer programs automatic copyright protection as literary works, by s.10 of the Agreement 
on Trade Related Property Rights (TRIPs). Thus, payments for any rights to use computer software fall within the plain meaning 
of royalties under Article 12. However, the OECD introduced confusion in 1992 by stating that payments for rights to operate a 
program by a user should be treated as business profits and not royalties (Commentary to article 12, para. 14). The proper 
question is whether the acts of copying concerned are protected by copyright: e.g. in many countries copying software onto a 
computer for private use is a permitted use (see the recent decision by the Supreme Court of India, Engineering Analysis 2021). 
Furthermore, when software is supplied in conjunction with the sale of a physical product (e.g. a car, or a ‘smart’ TV), especially 
when the user does not control operation of the software, the payment can be regarded as being for the product and not for rights 
to use the software. For further detail see BEPS Monitoring Group 2021.  
 
48 The paragraphs in the OECD commentary were also included in the UN model’s commentary, but with the addition of a 
dissenting view from some members (United Nations 2017: 315). This alternative position was amplified in further revisions agreed 
in 2021 to the Commentary on UN model Article 12. 
 
49 Payments for digital advertising were judged to be neither fees for technical services nor royalties by a tribunal in Right Florist 
(2013), although the government subsequently won on some of the arguments in later decisions (Tandon 2018: 3-4); payments 
for provision of bandwidth services have also been held to fall outside both categories (Reliance Jio 2019). In these cases, the 
payments were deductible by the customer, but could not be taxed as the business profits of the service provider since it was a 




The concern with the impact of digitalised services has led to an increased focus on how to 
tax TNCs on their net profits in line with their activities in each country. It is now also accepted 
that this includes the country of sales, in view of the increasingly close connection between 
supplier and customer, especially for services. This suggests that receiving revenue from sales 
in a country is sufficient to create a taxable nexus with that country. As we have seen in Section 
1.1, this was proposed in the Mexico model and was included as an option in the Commentary 
of the UN model of 1980. As discussed in the previous section, reliance on withholding taxes 
on the gross payments is largely due to the practical difficulties of determining net profits.  
 
The new article 12B now, for the first time, provides a specific method for defining taxable net 
business income by apportionment, although only for automated digital services and at the 
option of the taxpayer. This allows the source state to give the beneficial owner of the revenue 
the choice of having the ‘qualified profits’ taxed at the source country’s standard tax rate. The 
qualified profits would be calculated formulaically, as 30% of the amount resulting from 
applying the profitability ratio of the TNC group concerned (or of its relevant business segment) 
to the gross revenue from the relevant services in that country. Under this option, the tax 
payable would be directly related to the activity’s profitability for the TNC as a whole.50  
 
Pillar One of the BEPS project also proposes a formulaic method, but the formula envisaged 
is a fixed percentage, decided politically, unrelated to each TNC’s actual profitability. Also, as 
discussed in Section 1.2 above, the Pillar One blueprint includes rules for defining the source 
of revenues. To deal with the rather complex rules for income allocation and to avoid double 
taxation, the blueprint envisages that reporting, audit and tax assessment would be primarily 
by the tax authority of the TNC’s parent, with review by a representative panel from countries 
concerned. In contrast, Article 12B defines the source as the country of residence of the payor 
and uses a simpler withholding mechanism for collection.  
 
Several countries have recently explored options for source taxation of business income from 
services, testing their validity under existing international tax rules. For example, in 2018, 
Argentina’s federal tax administration, the Administración Federal de Ingresos Públicos (AFIP), 
issued opinions that digital ride-sharing platforms could be taxed on the income from 
passengers in Argentina. This was based on the view that such platforms provide 
transportation services through the drivers and, hence, could be considered to have a services 
PE in India. It has been reported that a challenge has been made to this interpretation of Article 
5.3.b under the ‘mutual agreement procedure’ (MAP) of the Argentina-Netherlands treaty since 
the company in question is resident in the Netherlands (Teijeiro and Vázquez 2019: 11).51 As 




50 The UK’s DST also gives the taxpayer an option for taxation on net profit, calculated as 80% of the operating margin on the 
relevant UK sales (UK Finance Act 2020: s.48). The operating margin takes account of the operating expenses attributable to the 
UK revenue, whereas the proposed UN Article 12B refers to the group’s profitability ratio on that business worldwide. 
 




In 2018, India introduced the concept of ‘significant economic presence’ for taxation of non-
residents on their income through a ‘business connection’ in India. This applies to transactions 
exceeding a prescribed amount in aggregate and is not limited to digitalised transactions, 
although mainly aimed at them. This was followed in 2019 by a discussion draft on the 
determination of taxable income in such cases, published for public comment. It proposed the 
introduction in India’s domestic law of a formulary method to define profits derived from India. 
The proposal is to multiply the revenues from sales in India by the global operational profit 
margin of the TNC and then attribute the taxable profits using an apportionment method 
applying a 3-factor formula of sales, employees and assets (India 2019: Paras. 150, 159, 
199).52 If enacted, the applicability of this method would depend on the interpretation of any 
relevant treaty. The 2019 discussion draft pointed out that India’s tax treaties are generally 
based on the UN model and, hence, include provisions for a services PE, as well as for 
formulary apportionment in determining income attributable to a PE. As shown in Section 2 
above, a substantial number of treaties in force contain these provisions, so other countries 
could consider adopting this approach. 
 
Such moves have not been limited to digitalised services. In 2015, it was reported that the tax 
authority of Saudi Arabia, the Department of Zakat and Income Tax (DZIT), had changed its 
interpretation of the taxable nexus for services, adopting the position that no physical presence 
is needed even of personnel, only that the services are delivered for the requisite period 
(normally 183 days) (EY 2015). As discussed in Section 1.1 above, some members of the UN 
Tax Committee considered that this is a valid interpretation of Article 5.3.b in the UN model, 
although OECD member states reject this view. An appeal by the taxpayer arguing that the 
DZIT interpretation was contrary to the Saudi Arabia-Netherlands tax treaty was upheld 
(Gidirim 2016), so it seems that the ruling would not be applied if there is such a conflicting 
treaty. 
  
Like Saudi Arabia, Nigeria has also long been concerned by the erosion of the tax base due 
to provision by non-resident entities of engineering and other services in the oil and gas sector. 
Nigerian legislation requires any foreign company intending to do business in Nigeria to 
incorporate a local affiliate (Companies and Allied Matters Act: s.54),53 thus side-stepping the 
nexus requirement in tax treaties. To determine the net profits of such a taxable person, 
Nigeria’s income tax law (Section 30) allows the Federal Inland Revenue Services (FIRS) to 
assess profits tax on a ‘fair and reasonable percentage’ of turnover. It seems that this is done 
by charging the standard corporate income tax rate of 30% on a ‘deemed profit’ of 20% of the 
turnover, an effective tax rate of 6% of the turnover. However, TNCs can separate the activities 
so that they can attribute some elements, such as design and consultancy, to an offshore 
entity. If the payment for these elements is made outside Nigeria, a withholding tax could not 
apply. In such circumstances, the FIRS has taken the view that the local subsidiary can 
constitute a PE of the foreign entity, although this has led to conflicting court decisions. (See 
Ndajiwo 2020: 14-15). 
  
2.3 Aligning with and Reshaping International Tax Rules 
 
 
52 The employee factor would be a 50:50 weighting of manpower and wage costs; for enterprises whose SEP is due to the number 
of users, it proposed modifications of the formula; where the TNC is globally loss-making, it proposed a minimum rate of 2% of 
gross revenue or turnover derived from Indian operations. 
 
53 This does not apply to foreign companies exempted under a treaty, presumably to comply with provisions of investment treaties 
that grant a right of establishment. 
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Tax treaties can be a significant restriction on national tax policy since they are directly 
incorporated into domestic law in most countries, in different ways, creating rights for non-
residents. They can even override conflicting provisions of national tax law, giving non-
residents tax advantages over local companies. Treaties are negotiated between 
governments, generally with little public or parliamentary scrutiny. Often the impetus is political 
and driven by the assumption that they will stimulate foreign investment with no real 
assessment of the impact on either investment or tax revenue and sometimes even no 
involvement of the revenue authority (Mutava 2019). Fortunately, this is now changing, with a 
growing awareness of the need for careful scrutiny of proposed treaties and a re-evaluation 
and, where necessary, renegotiation of existing ones.54  
 
Governments can and should renegotiate or withdraw from unsuitable treaties, particularly if 
they result in tax losses due to treaty-shopping.55 To protect their right to tax income from 
services performed or paid for in the country, they should ensure that their treaties allow a 
suitable withholding tax. Where their treaties include the UN model’s Other Income article, 
countries can clarify that this justifies the application of a withholding tax.56 This can be made 
even more explicit by the inclusion in treaties of provisions based on Articles 12, 12A and 12B 
of the UN model, or the broad version of 12A in the Commentary. Alternatively, where treaties 
include Articles 5.3.b and 7.4, net profits could be taxed, using an apportionment methodology, 
although some may contest this. 
 
Fortunately, developing countries generally have few tax treaties, so compliance with treaty 
provisions should not determine national tax policy. Treaties are supposed to encourage direct 
investment between the two states concerned; hence treaty benefits should only be available 
to genuine residents of the treaty partner. Some consider that even one treaty can open the 
way for all TNCs since they can exploit the treaty system by routing activities and transactions 
through affiliates resident in suitable jurisdictions. However, this can be countered by applying 
rules against treaty-shopping or treaty abuse, and countries should ensure the inclusion of 
suitable anti-abuse provisions both in domestic law and in all their treaties.  
 
 
54 Notably, in Kenya the Tax Justice Network’s legal challenge to a proposed treaty with Mauritius (Mutava and Hearson 2019), 
has led to public debate, with the publication of proposed treaties and their scrutiny by the National Assembly. OECD countries 
have also come under pressure to evaluate whether their treaties are development-friendly and some, such as Ireland and the 
Netherlands, have attempted such reviews. See, for example, the debate in Ireland’s parliament on 20 September 2018, on the 
treaty signed with Ghana (Dáil Éireann 2018). 
 
55 For example, treaties with Mauritius have been cancelled by Senegal (2019) and Zambia (2020), and renegotiated by South 
Africa (2013), Rwanda (2013), and India (2016).  
 
56 This could be done by individual countries or collectively; for example, ATAF could revise the Commentary to this article in its 




This has now been facilitated through the commitment for members of the Inclusive Framework 
on BEPS to include a principal purpose test (PPT) in all their treaties. The quickest and easiest 
way to achieve this is through the so-called multilateral instrument (MLI) on BEPS (OECD 
2016).57 However, progress has been surprisingly slow: by mid-2020, only some 370 treaties 
had been amended to comply with this minimum standard.58 This is partly because many 
signatory states have yet to ratify the MLI, while a significant number have not even signed it, 
although it is open to all states. Also, states can decide which of their existing treaties to 
designate as covered by the MLI, and unlisted treaties must be separately renegotiated.59 
However, there should be no need to link the inclusion of this minimum standard to any wider 
treaty renegotiation; its inclusion should be regarded as automatic. 
 
The inclusion of a PPT provision in all treaties would be a significant step towards ending treaty 
shopping.60 In particular, it could be used to prevent the use of conduits in low-tax jurisdictions 
to provide services from offshore unless these entities are genuinely carrying out the relevant 
activities. To clarify this, the Commentary includes an example discussing the application of 
the PPT to an affiliate providing management, financial, or other services to other affiliates in 
a region.61 While it suggests that the choice of a low-tax location for such an affiliate does not 
in itself justify denial of treaty benefits, it does make clear that the affiliate must be shown to 
assume real risks and exercise substantive economic functions through its own appropriately 
qualified personnel. This is rarely likely to be the case for conduit entities. A more vigorous 
application of provisions against treaty shopping would protect countries against abuse of tax 
treaties that undermines their tax base. 
 
Another advantage for developing countries is that their treaties are often based on the UN 
model and, hence, generally provide stronger protection of source taxation. However, as we 
have also seen, the application of many of these provisions depends on their interpretation. 
This has tended to disadvantage developing countries because expertise in international tax, 
like many other fields, is dominated by the perspectives of those who can command the most 
resources in its production. The processes of interpretation of tax treaties have been 
dominated by experts from capital-exporting countries and paid advisers of TNCs. They are 
ever-present in the key arenas, both where concepts are formulated (such as professional 
congresses and publications) and where norms are established and applied (such as writing 
commentaries and guidelines and resolving disputes). Unsurprisingly, they have generally 
supported the perspective that tax treaties’ restriction of source taxation is necessary and 
desirable to stimulate foreign investment. The fundamental flaws of the international tax 
system, which became evident particularly following the great financial crisis in 2008-9, have 
led to the recent rethinking of international tax rules and the possibility of a paradigm shift 
(Picciotto 2021). This should aim to align the taxation of TNC profits with where activities take 
place, which generally means the source country. 
 
 
57 Countries can also include these provisions through bilateral negotiations. The BEPS minimum standard allows three options: 
(i) a PPT, (ii) a PPT combined with a ‘simplified’ limitation of benefits provision (also included in the MLI) and (iii) a more detailed 
limitation of benefits provision together with detailed anti-conduit rules. The third option was included because the US would not 
accept the PPT, and this is one reason the US has not joined the MLI. 
 
58 As at 1 July 2020 (OECD 2021: Para. 46).  
 
59 For example, Mauritius, initially listed only 23 treaties as covered when it signed the MLI in 2017, excluding almost all its treaties 
with other African countries and announcing its intention to deal with them bilaterally. On ratification in 2019, all its treaties were 
listed as covered, but many are still not amended because many of its treaty partners are not yet MLI parties. 
 
60 The PPT has now also been included as Paragraph 9 of Article 29 of both the OECD and the UN models and the commentary 
to this provision adopted in the BEPS project report on Action 6 has been included as Paragraphs 169-182 of the OECD 
Commentary on Article 29, which are reproduced also in the UN model’s Commentary.  
 
61 Example G in Paragraph 182 (United Nations 2017: 794-5). 
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Hence, much can be done to reshape international tax rules by adopting interpretations that 
appropriately protect source taxation. Countries should make their interpretation clear to 
provide more certainty for investors. Several examples of provisions with disputed meanings 
have been discussed in earlier sections of this paper. These include in particular: 
 
(i) that the time threshold in the Services provision in Article 5.3.b applies to the period 
for which the services are furnished and not necessarily the physical presence of 
personnel (Section 1.2 above); 
 
(ii) that the additional Paragraph 3 of the Other Income article in the UN model allows 
the source state to introduce a withholding tax on payments for items not already 
specified in the treaty (Section 1.1); 
 
(iii) that Article 12 on Royalties applies to payments for the right to use the copyright in 
computer programs or software, including the right to operate the program (Section 
2.1); 
(iv) that the independent entity principle in Articles 7 and 9 refers to the right to adjust 
accounts to ensure a fair allocation of profits, and is not incompatible with 
apportionment (Section 1.3); 
 
(v) that Article 7.4 allows attribution of profits to a PE based on apportionment of the 
TNC’s global profits and that an affiliate of the TNC can be treated as a PE and taxed 
on this basis. 
 
It is important that source countries act together to ensure an appropriate interpretation of 
these provisions. In principle, this should be the role of the UN Tax Committee. In practice, 
however, it has aimed to try to find compromises between its diverse membership, a third of 
whom come from OECD countries. Indeed, these grey areas and disputed interpretations have 
generally resulted from formulations of the model treaty provisions that, deliberately or not, 
papered over the cracks of divergent views. The task of the UN Committee is made particularly 
difficult because of the coalescence, in the specialist technical discourse on treaties and their 
interpretation, around an orthodoxy that is dominated by the OECD perspective. Its recent 
work has begun to strike a more independent path, but this needs to be strengthened by 
developing technical capacity that is able and willing to challenge the dominant orthodoxy. This 
could perhaps be provided through regional organisations such as ATAF, as well as the 
strengthening of the capacity not only of revenue authorities but of wider civil society in 




The focus on taxation of international services in this paper shows the need for reforms that 
go beyond current concerns about digitalisation and consumer services. The growth of 
services and their internationalisation date back to the 1970s and have exacerbated economic 
imbalances and underdevelopment. The restrictions on source taxation in international tax 
rules have greatly contributed to these problems by undermining the tax base of services-
importing countries while also facilitating TNC tax avoidance more generally. Furthermore, 
these limitations have created competitive disadvantages for local services providers and 
discouraged the creation of local jobs in source countries by TNCs, particularly in high-value 




Countries that are primarily services importers have attempted to resist the strengthening of 
residence-based taxation led by the OECD. Hence, provisions allowing a wider scope for 
source taxation have been retained in the UN model convention and in actual treaties. 
However, these have been subject to continuing conflicts and contestation over their 
formulation and interpretation, leaving a legacy of ambiguity and confusion. 
  
Digitalisation has sparked a dramatic reversal of perspective by OECD countries. This has now 
led to a rapid acceptance of principles they have long resisted; that taxation of TNCs can be 
based on apportionment of an appropriate fraction of their global income and by countries from 
where they derive income, regardless of physical presence. This opens up the prospect for a 
fundamental paradigm shift in international taxation, reviving understandings present since its 
origins but which had become eclipsed since the 1970s. 
  
However, the reshaping of the system depends not just on international political and economic 
power relations. It also requires major changes in the mindset of the international tax experts 
who mould and manage the rules and their interpretation and application. This entails more 
than simply improving the training of specialists from developing countries, which may end up 
only reproducing and extending an inappropriate orthodoxy. It involves working constructively 
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